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Abstract 
Purpose – The paper focuses on strategies and ‘spoken discourses’ used to construct legitimation 
around change at the individual level. Comparing changes in financial accounting, budgeting and 
performance management at two government levels (Westminster and Scotland), it explores the 
use of legitimation strategies in the implementation of accounting change and its perceived 
outcomes. 
Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on semi-structured interviews, six 
legitimation/delegitimation strategies are used to code the transcribed data. Patterns with the 
perceived outcomes of change are explored.  
Findings – Changes introduced to enhance ‘rational’ decision making are often received as pushed 
by some source of authority. Regardless of the interviewees’ background and level, the results 
suggest that for radical accounting change to embed, it is necessary for it to be perceived as rational, 
rather than merely driven by authorisation-based pressures. Conversely, incremental change is 
associated with modest legitimation via rationalisation and delegitimation based on pathos and 
rationalisation. 
Research limitations/implications – The study deals with actors’ legitimation strategies and 
perceptions of change. These may not correspond to actual substantial change. Taken-for-granted 
ideas often remain ‘under the radar’, therefore care must be taken in interpreting the results. The 
focus of the empirical study is on the UK, therefore conclusions are restricted to this context.  
Originality/value – Existing studies struggle to explain organisations’ heterogeneity and practice 
variation; this study sheds light on how individual legitimation, which may lead to different 
organisational results, occurs. Differences in how actors interpret changes may be based on their 
position (central vs. devolved administration) and on their ownership of the changes.  
 
Keywords – accounting change, public sector, legitimation strategies. 
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 Achieving radical change: a comparative study of public-sector accounting in 
Westminster and Scotland 
 
Introduction 
Change can be imposed, but if it is not seen as legitimate (or having substantive justification) in 
the context in which it is applied, it is likely to be resisted. Previous literature, both in accounting 
and the public sector, has mainly looked at accounting change, focusing on organisation-wide 
factors (Kitchener, 1999; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Liguori and Steccolini, 2012; Liguori, 2012b). 
There is limited work on how accounting change is legitimated at the individual level, within and 
across organisations, and how legitimation strategies affect the reproduction and outcome (or 
significance) of change; a few studies only pointing to the importance of legitimation rather than 
addressing it directly (Broadbent, 1992; Covaleski et al., 2003). Comparing the changes in financial 
accounting, budgeting and performance management (collectively referred to as ‘accounting’ for 
convenience) that took place over the past 20 years at two different government levels (the central 
administration of Westminster and the Scottish devolved administration), the paper aims to 
contribute to this body of literature by exploring how organisational actors justify change, and 
whether their arguments are associated with the outcome of change. The study focuses on how 
legitimation strategies are used to construct a sense of legitimation around change at the individual 
level (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Vaara et al., 2006). The paper sheds light on the translation 
and legitimation cues that may lead to different types of organisational change by exploring 
patterns and relationships between legitimation strategies used to interpret the changes and the 
perceived outcome (be it ‘radical’, or merely ‘incremental’) of change. Moreover, it investigates 
change and legitimation dynamics not only across different departments (central finance vs. 
operational departments), but also at different government levels (Westminster and Scotland). 
Differences emerge in relation to the level of ownership that the organisational actors perceive 
themselves as having over the changes being implemented.  
The paper is organised as follows: the next section presents a review of the relevant 
literature on legitimation strategies and outcomes of change; this is followed by the methodology, 
and a summary of background and context of the UK accounting systems. The subsequent 
sections present the results for Westminster and Scotland. The penultimate section discusses the 
main findings, with the final section drawing the conclusions and proposing avenues for further 
research in the area.  
 
Legitimation strategies and accounting   
Both accounting and public administration scholars have increasingly recognised that global 
accounting reform trends have been translated with significant local variations (Barzelay, 2001; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). It has been suggested that changes do not always yield the expected 
results (Hood and Peters, 2004; Lapsley, 2009) and they tend to produce a layering, rather than a 
replacement, of practices over time (Hyndman et al., 2014). Much attention has been devoted to 
considering the dynamics and processes of accounting change at the organisational level 
(Broadbent, 1992; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Connolly and Hyndman, 2011; Liguori and Steccolini, 
2012); less has been done to consider the role that actors’ understanding of change can play at the 
individual level. How accounting changes are perceived, translated and legitimated at the micro 
level, and how this affects the significance of change, has received limited attention. In order to 
explain why the introduction of a new practice succeeds or fails in a certain institutional field, 
however, it is essential to understand how individual actors legitimate or delegitimate change and 
the arguments they mobilise for it. The sources of change and legitimation are made available in 
the field by the institutional players themselves, who engage in a process that, in institutional 
theory, has been alternatively defined as ‘theorisation’ (Strang and Meyer, 1994), ‘translation’ 
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(Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996), ‘editing’ (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) or ‘legitimation’ (Green and 
Li, 2011).  
The legitimation of change, in the context in which it is applied, is essential if change is to 
be accepted and resistance avoided. According to Scott (1995, p.45), legitimation ‘is not a 
commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative 
support or consonance with relevant rules or laws.’ The specific context conditions define ‘which 
ideas are considered ‘sensible’, which constructions of reality are seen as ‘realistic’, and which 
claims are held as ‘legitimate’ within a certain policy at a specific time’ (Koopmans and Statham, 
1999, p.228). In legitimating change, language plays an important role for its diffusion and 
implementation (Green, 2004). The rhetorical arguments and strategies set in place during change 
can strengthen or weaken the adoption of new practices and the way actors understand and 
rationalise the usefulness of the change itself (Hirsch, 1986; Green, 2004). Legitimation strategies 
are here defined as the discursive devices ‘used to (re)construct senses of legitimacy/illegitimacy’ 
(Vaara et al., 2006, p.789), i.e. micro-level discursive practices that are used or talked about when 
making sense of, and giving sense to, one or more changes. The ambiguity regarding the process 
and the outcome of change induces organisational actors to use rhetorical arguments to construct 
reality and gain legitimacy on certain organisational structures and beliefs (Creed et al., 2002; 
Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). The more persuasive the supporting reasons justifying the 
introduction of a new practice, the more rational its adoption will be perceived, and ultimately 
accepted. However, how rhetoric and language shape the introduction and reproduction of change 
within organisations has been little investigated and, in particular, how legitimation (or 
delegitimation) strategies are used at the individual level (by individual actors) to achieve change is 
still unclear (Vaara et al., 2006; Green et al., 2008). More field-based micro-analysis has been 
advocated to reach a better understanding of the complexity and the contradictions that can arise 
in legitimating change (Vaara et al., 2006; Green et al., 2008). This can also help explain why the 
implementation of similar ideas and practices has often resulted in notably different results at the 
organisational level (Etherington and Richardson, 1994; Liguori and Steccolini, 2012). 
Organisation study research has looked at the rhetorical legitimation of change, mainly 
focusing on particular fields, such as industrial restructuring and mergers and acquisitions (Vaara, 
2002; Comtois et al., 2004; Vaara et al., 2006). Legitimation strategies have been found to be 
important: in processes of institutional change (Green, 2004; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005); in 
actors’ struggles over controversial decisions, such as organisational shutdowns (Erkama and 
Vaara, 2010); in contested issues, such as climate change (Lefsrud and Meyer) and international 
corporate investments (Joutsenvirta and Vaara, 2015); and in policy-making and institutional 
change (Brown et al., 2012). In relation to accounting firms, Covaleski et al. (2003) studied the ‘Big 
Five’ to investigate how competing factions re-institutionalise societal expectations of proper 
professional behaviour to legitimate a transformation of jurisdictions. They found that accountants 
tend to use abstract rhetorical arguments to legitimate and justify changing jurisdictions.  
Other accounting-focused studies have mainly looked at the actors’ attribution of meanings, 
limiting the analysis to the cognitive attributes of accounting narratives and documents (see Aerts, 
2001; Tsang, 2002; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). Using a theoretical framework different from the 
one adopted in this paper, some have also utilised legitimacy theory to investigate environmental 
disclosure as a mandatory practice or as a social contract (Mobus, 2005). For instance, Cho (2009) 
examined the environmental disclosure decisions and practices of one of the largest oil and gas 
companies in the world. He concluded that communication played an essential role to legitimate 
the company’s actions, and social and environmental disclosures remained a powerful legitimacy 
device for greater external accountability. Hrasky (2012) explored whether Australian companies 
adjusted their footprint-related disclosure responses; she concluded that, while carbon-intensive 
sectors were pursuing a moral legitimation strategy, the less carbon-intensive sectors relied more 
on symbolic disclosure. Buhr (2002), on the basis of analysing environmental reporting in two 
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Canadian companies, investigated the moral and pragmatic strategies used to justify environmental 
issues and sustainability reporting. These studies have largely focused on the external legitimation 
of change, rather than intra-organisational, individual, legitimation. Moreover, previous research 
has mainly dealt with moral and normative aspects of legitimation, often from the external 
stakeholders’ point of view. We claim there is still a lack of comprehensive studies that examine 
the broad spectrum of rhetorical and legitimation arguments that organisational actors have 
available (and may draw upon) to make sense and justify accounting change. This study aims to fill 
this gap through the use of a different theoretical lens (the one of legitimation strategies), 
spotlighting individual legitimation strategies; an approach rarely adopted when investigating 
accounting phenomena.  
 
Change and legitimation strategies 
Despite the contribution of the interdisciplinary and critical movement (Neu et al., 2001), a wide 
spectrum of society often sees accounting as a neutral technology that, in the hands of rational 
decision makers, can be deployed to generate and draw attention to information to support 
decision makers in making better decisions (Knights and Collinson, 1987). However, the 
implementation of accounting changes may be framed in a variety of ways, ranging from value-
neutral procedures to ideologically-charged instruments. Change may be contested, resisted or 
transformed by organisational groups (Motion and Leitch, 2009). The implementation of 
accounting techniques is not a mechanistic, simplified introduction of a new practice into formal 
organisational structures, procedures or mechanisms. Rather it represents a translation of general 
ideas adapted to local circumstances (Brunsson, 1989). To investigate the role language and 
rhetorical arguments play, different research approaches have often been brought together under 
the label ‘rhetorical institutionalism’ (Green and Li 2011) and mainly include research on framing 
(Fiss and Zajac 2006), discourses (Phillips et al. 2004) and rhetoric (Green 2004) within 
institutional fields. This study finds its theoretical roots in this latter group.  
When dealing with legitimation and rhetorical techniques and the introduction of new 
practices which potentially replace, or undermine, existing structures, Green (2004) and Green and 
Li (2011) propose the identification of a source of ‘endogenous change’ based on the use of 
different legitimation strategies. It should be noted that this is different from the legitimacy theory 
approach, which focuses on the process of legitimation through which an organisation seeks 
approval (or avoidance of sanction) from society, frequently through voluntary external disclosures 
(Suchman, 1995). In contrast to this, focusing on legitimation strategies stresses the importance of 
individuals and their construction of reality during change. This is mirrored in their rhetorical 
arguments accompanying the introduction of change and affecting the way it is interpreted. 
Following Vaara et al. (2006) and Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), new techniques and ideas can 
be put forth relying on one of five discursive strategies (or a combination of these): authorisation, 
rationalisation, normalisation, moralisation or narrativisation. Authorisation strategies refer to 
legitimation through reference to authority (such as government or politicians), custom, law and 
persons upon whom institutional authority of some kind has been bestowed. Rationalisation is 
related to legitimation by assessing the benefits that a certain course of action can bring. In this 
study, for instance, it refers to issues such as rational decision-making practices, cost-benefit 
analysis, effective planning, the importance of resources and skills, etc. Normalisation legitimates 
by exemplarity that can involve past or current cases that are deemed as something ‘normal’ and 
thus used as standards. In this study with respect to the use of normalisation strategies, reference 
was frequently made to professions and professional standards (which are particularly important 
in areas such as accounting). The use of such strategies is likely to be affected by the actors’ 
background and education. Previous studies have highlighted the importance of the accounting 
profession and background in the design and implementation of reforms (Humphrey 2005; 
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Christensen and Parker 2010). Indeed, accountants can be viewed as privileged ‘communities’ able 
to understand the newly introduced technologies, ‘insiders’ who have knowledge of technical 
accounting issues and tend to be supportive of ‘modern’ technologies of accounting (Ezzamel et 
al., 2005). Moralisation refers to legitimation by reference to specific value systems and what is 
considered ethical in a specific field. In an accounting context, this is not only linked to the purpose 
of serving external and internal stakeholders’ information needs, but also to the identification and 
judgement of accounting scandals or cases of professional misconduct. Finally, narrativisation is 
about legitimation conveyed through narratives; telling a story, indeed, can provide evidence of 
acceptable, appropriate or preferential behaviour for current changes and future practice. More 
specific examples of these strategies in the context under study are provided in the methodology 
section. 
Authorisation, rationalisation and normalisation strategies align with Green’s (2004) notion 
of logos (legitimation of change through the adoption of rational arguments from different 
sources), while moralisation strategies align with what Green (2004) calls ethos (legitimation 
through credibility, moral authority or tradition). He also identifies a route of legitimation via 
pathos, i.e. legitimation by appealing to emotions (Green et al., 2008; Green and Li, 2011), which 
does not necessarily coincide with the above strategies. The variation in the acceptance of a 
particular change may be influenced by the deployment of specific arguments in particular 
situations. However, legitimation strategies are not always intentional or conscious, and their use 
usually decreases with time, when justifications are less needed as a change becomes accepted or a 
new practice is taken for granted (Green, 2004).  
 Legitimation strategies influence the organisational conditions that help restore or justify 
social status quos, or even destroy them through delegitimation (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). 
In order to undermine or stop change, different actors might use antagonistic framings or 
destructive strategies, criticising the validity or ridiculing the source of informationi (Van Leeuwen 
and Wodak, 1999; Lefsrud and Meyer, 2012). Green et al. (2008) opine that different actors tend 
to use the same rhetorical sequences during successive periods of change. Moreover, movements 
from the status quo, or stable institutional field arrangements, are often initially brought about by 
emotional appeals to redirect limited social attention. Pathos arguments may have a part to play, 
particularly at the beginning of the institutionalisation process, because institutions have an 
inherent social inertia. Legitimation is frequently viewed as a prerequisite for the institutionalisation 
of new ideas and practices (Kitchener, 1999). At the same time, institutionalisation contributes to 
legitimation because, over time, established and widely spread ideas and practices no longer require 
the use of specific legitimation strategies (Green, 2004; Green and Li, 2011). 
 
Accounting change and its outcome 
The way organisational actors perceive, talk about and legitimate change is inevitably interwoven 
with the way they react to and implement it. We posit that the legitimation strategies used to talk 
about and understand change will affect the outcome of the process of change, i.e. the way change 
is embedded and its significance within an organisation. This relationship has never been 
investigated before. However, the different embedding often achieved even in the presence of 
similar change requirements cannot be explained by the arational mimicry suggested by the 
traditional strands of institutional theory, which has been criticised for paying scant attention to 
individual micro processes (Lounsbury, 2001). Within the same institutional realm, archetype 
theory provides a more comprehensive framework able to address such limitations also in the 
study of accounting. Archetype theory (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996) represents a powerful tool to fine-grain the level of analysis, and identify and interpret both 
the outcome and pace of change (Liguori and Steccolini, 2012; Liguori, 2012a and 2012b). It allows 
distinguishing between different outcomes (radical vs. incremental) and different levels (structures 
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and systems vs. ideas and values) of change, adopting a micro-level perspective. While a number 
of accounting (and other) studies have adopted these lenses to study change (Kitchener, 1999; 
McNulty and Ferlie, 2004; Liguori and Steccolini, 2012; Liguori, 2012a and 2012b), they neglected 
(or downplayed) the role of individual rhetoric and discursive elements, stopping at the discussion 
of organisational factors and their interaction. The present study attempts to shed more light on 
these less investigated elements.  
 An archetype is defined as a set of structures and systems that reflects a certain interpretive 
scheme (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). Organisational structures and systems, such as 
management techniques, performance dashboards or financial accounting systems, can be seen as 
embodiments of ideas, beliefs and values that underlie their existence and functioning. These very 
ideas constitute what archetype theory defines as an ‘overarching and prevailing interpretive 
scheme’. An archetype is, thus, a set of ideas, belief and values that shape prevailing conceptions 
of what an organisation should be doing, how it should be doing it and how it should be judged, 
combined with structures and processes that implement and reinforce those ideas. Change is not 
indiscriminate, but happens differently on the basis of the levels involved (i.e. systems and 
structures and/or interpretive schemes). The consistency of change with the existing archetype 
defines the distinction between incremental and radical outcomes of changeii. The former takes 
place when organisations modify their structures and systems in a way that is consistent with the 
pre-existing archetype, i.e. structures and systems change, but the old interpretive schemes are used 
to make sense of them. Radical change, instead, involves a shift and adjustment in both structures 
(and systems) and interpretive schemes, which both move from a pre-existing archetype to a new 
one (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).iii  
Previous studies adopting an archetype perspective showed that, although confronted with 
similar environmental pressures, organisations often display different patterns of change (McNulty 
and Ferlie, 2004; Hammerschmid and Meyer, 2005). The movement identified in the public sector, 
in particular, is from a bureaucratic to a managerial archetype (for details of these archetypes in 
accounting see Liguori and Steccolini, 2012; Liguori, 2012a and 2012b). This literature, however, 
stopped at the consideration of organisational factors, such as skills, leadership and resource 
distribution, and failed to include individual features of translation and legitimation of change. Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens (2005) acknowledged the overlapping and consistency between the Burns and 
Scapens’ (2000) model (often used in accounting research) and Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) 
framework. More recently, Ter Bogt and Scapens (2014) have used the notion of archetype, as a 
form of coherent structures, ideas and practices to investigate the relationship between institutions 
and actions. Their study, however, focused on the level of field-wide institutional logics, rather 
than on the actors’ translations during change.  
This paper focuses on this latter aspect by analysing the relationship between actors’ legitimation 
strategies (used to understand change) and the outcome of change actors themselves perceive and 
contribute to shape. 
 
Methodology 
This research investigates how organisational actors justify change, and how their arguments are 
associated with the perceived outcome of change. It is based on the comparative case studies 
(Pettigrew, 1990; Ragin, 2000) of the Westminster central government and the Scottish devolved 
administration. International comparisons of the public-sector managerial reforms that took place 
from the 1990s onwards indicate that they have been implemented at a quicker pace and more 
enthusiastically in some countries compared to others, with the UK viewed as a high-intensity, 
early adopter (Hood, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Managerial reforms deeply involved 
accounting systems and also brought about a process of decentralisation and devolution of 
government, which has fostered the increased independence of ‘devolved administrations’. The 
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UK, in particular, through the comparison of Westminster and Scotland, provides an interesting 
case to investigate how similar accounting changes can be implemented and legitimated differently 
at different organisational and government levels, even within the same state.  
The paper explores the changes in financial accounting, budgeting and performance 
management in the public sector that started in the 1990s, the reactions to these and the 
legitimation strategies used to describe them at two organisational levels: the finance departments 
(for simplicity identified as Westminster Finance - WF - for Westminster and Scottish Finance – 
SF - for Scotland), who firstly pushed the changes; and the operationally-focused departments, 
largely concerned with the delivery of services. Financial accounting, budgeting and performance 
management are at the core of the managerial reforms that were introduced in the public sector 
over the past few decades. Changes in these three areas have often been implemented in an 
integrated fashion and together (for a detailed discussion, see Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016). In 
both Westminster and Scotland, two operational departments (identified as WD for Westminster 
and SD for Scotland) were considered: rural development and higher education. While the finance 
departments had the task of translating the political ideas into technical requirements and pushing 
the accounting changes down into the rest of the organisation; the more operationally-focused 
departments had to translate the new changes and legitimate (or delegitimate) their use in everyday 
activities. As the implementation paths of the same changes may vary within, and be perceived as 
more applicable to, differing activities of government, the two line departments were selected 
following a maximum variation sampling (Patton, 2002), on the basis of their different output 
measurability. Drawing on the studies of Brown and Potoski (2003) and Cristofoli et al. (2010), 
activities that are more prone to commercial valuation, such as environmental and agricultural ones 
(see, for instance, insect control, snow ploughing, etc.) are expected to show higher output 
measurability than those involving care of people or development of skills, such as cultural and 
arts programmes (and, we posit, education services).  
In Westminster, the main originator of change was HM Treasury (WF), one of 24 
ministerial departments within the UK central government; it was also responsible for developing 
and executing the UK government’s public finance and economic policy. A range of changes have 
been introduced under the auspices of WF in order to facilitate effective management in the more-
operationally-focused departments. On the side of the receivers of change, Westminster rural 
development falls within the competencies of the Department for Environment, Food & Rural 
Affairs; this is responsible for general policy and regulations on environmental, food and rural 
issues. Westminster higher education is under the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills. 
This department engages with universities and colleges to facilitate them in providing high quality 
teaching and research, with funding in research informed by a Research Excellence Framework 
(REF: a performance measurement framework that utilises expert review to assess, largely, 
research outputs and impacts). In Scotland, since 2010, the government directorates are 
responsible for progressing their strategic objectives. The finance functions of the government 
(referred to as SF) currently fall under the auspices of the Cabinet Secretary for Finance, 
Employment and Sustainable Growth. Rural development in Scotland is the responsibility of the 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Communities Directorate, with higher education falling under the 
Employability, Skills and Lifelong Learning Directorate. The 19 autonomous colleges and 
universities are all funded by the Scottish government via the Scottish Funding Council, established 
in 2005.  
Exploring legitimation strategies and change required asking organisational actors about 
their experiences and perceptions. This involved conducting semi-structured interviews to 
reconstruct the understanding of the key actors as to the main accounting changes over the last 
two decades, and the related (implicit) rhetorical strategies of legitimation or delegitimation. 
Questions were asked about the most relevant accounting changes (and sources of such changes) 
they had to face, as well as people’s reactions and views of such changes, together with their 
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perceived impacts. The interviews were conducted with 18 senior managers in Westminster and 
16 in Scotland, who were responsible for both policy and accounting issues. The interviewees are 
identified later in any quotations by their designations: Westminster Finance from WF1 to WF4, 
Scottish Finance from SF1 to SF8, WD1 to WD14 and SD1 to SD8 for the operational 
departments’ interviewees in Westminster and Scotland respectively. The Scottish interviewees had 
significant knowledge and experience of accounting requirements and changes introduced both 
before and after the 1999 devolution (see later for explanation regarding devolution). 
The interviewees, who were selected to get information-rich cases from those directly 
involved in the process of change, were identified through snowball sampling (Patton, 2002). In 
terms of professional background, in Westminster all the WF interviewees had an accounting 
background and professional qualification, while 10 out of 14 had a similar background in WD. 
Six out of eight of the SF interviewees had an accounting background and related professional 
qualification, as did five out of eight in SDiv. Because of their extensive service and long 
institutional memory (on average, 15 years of tenure in Westminster and 20 years in Scotland), the 
majority of the interviewees were able to reflect on the changes over a considerable period of time 
(covering either all of the period under analysis, or a vast part of it). As the interviewees’ 
reconstruction of events could have been influenced and limited by their memory and ability to 
recollect changes that took place in the past, we relied on triangulation of investigators, informants 
and data sources (Patton, 2002). In the short term sources of change may appear blurred, however, 
in the long term, relationships may become clearer to organisational members. As found in other 
studies (Liguori and Steccolini, 2012), during the research, several of the interviewees admitted 
that the interview was also useful to them in providing a clearer understanding of the actual 
meaning of a change that had been implemented. This strengthens the validity and credibility of 
our findings. The process of ex-post rationalisation allowed both researchers and interviewees to 
identify the real epoch-making changes, which may have been less visible at the time they were 
being implemented. Similarly, a more comprehensive evaluation of the changes became possible. 
It is important to note that this study shares the view of processes of change as continuous (Poole 
et al., 2000): adjustment and changes to some of the accounting systems were present and being 
discussed also at the time the interviews were carried out (see, for instance, the Clear Line of Sight 
– CLOS – project, Table 1).  
The interviews were carried out between the end of 2012 and spring 2014, and each lasted, 
on average, one hour. Each was recorded and transcribed in full for coding. A preliminary coding 
scheme was developed based on the relevant literature on change and legitimation strategies. 
Following an iterative process, the coding scheme was refined and applied to ensure data 
consistency. The coding scheme was applied to each of the interviews independently by the two 
researchers, with all cases of disagreement being reviewed and resolved as a team. Data coding and 
analysis were supported by ATLAS.ti 6. A specific argument was coded when a legitimation 
strategy was used with regard to one of the possible areas of accounting change (financial 
accounting, budgeting or performance management) or relating to the reforms as a whole. A 
question about the main changes perceived by the interviewees was used as ‘ice breaker’, followed 
by prompts for each of the different possible areas of change; this was to ensure that all the changes 
identified in the literature were covered/discussed. The range of implemented changes and their 
classification refer to those reconstructed through official documents, interviews and literature 
review (see Table 1). Official documents (identified utilising a variety of contacts, including high-
level HM Treasury and Scottish Finance networks) included, for instance, the Green and White 
Papers and the CLOS report for Westminster, as well as the National Performance Framework 
(NPF) scheme for Scotland.  
In distinguishing the legitimation strategies, the typologies proposed by a number of 
writers were combined and resulted in six legitimation/delegitimation strategies being 
operationalised: authorisation (references to political or mimetic pressures, financial crisis, fiscal 
requirements, external stakeholders, market pressures, the role of the EU, Government, law and 
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regulation, internal management, etc.); rationalisation (such as references to managerial and 
accounting reforms, the importance of culture, effective planning and decision making, skills and 
education, resources, IT services, etc.); normalisation (based on references to profession, 
comparison between public and private sector, etc.); moralisation (such as transparency, gender 
equality, social and environmental sustainability, good administration, etc.); narrativisation 
(through the use of organisational ‘stories’ or history, accounting scandals or exemplars of 
behaviour); and pathos (references to the role of personal or organisational commitment to 
change, career dedication, patriotism, etc.). Legitimation strategies were coded as ‘1’, whereas 
delegitimation strategies were coded as ‘2’. As highlighted in previous studies, frequently, a number 
of strategies were combined in the same argument by the interviewees to help them make their 
point, or strengthen their particular view on a change. The number of occurrences for each strategy 
was computed so that a repetition of the same argument within the same answer was only counted 
once. The absolute counts and relative prevalence of each legitimation strategy by departmental 
level and government is presented in Table 2. Since within the same argument, a number of 
strategies could be used, the number of strategies counted in Table 2 is different from the total in 
Table 3 (where only one outcome of change per argument was coded). The same is true for Table 
4, where more strategies were coded in each argument and for each outcome of change identified.  
Finally, in identifying the perceived outcome of change, the research drew on the 
classifications proposed by Greenwood and Hinings (1996), Liguori and Steccolini (2012) and 
Liguori (2012a). Questions were asked to enquire indirectly about the actual use of the new 
accounting tools, the decision-making criteria used and the agreement with the new managerial 
ideas. Following Liguori and Steccolini (2012), radical change was identified whenever it was 
possible to highlight a consistent movement from the previous bureaucratic archetype to the new 
managerial one in both accounting structures and related interpretive schemes (i.e. the related 
ideas, values and taken-for-granted actions, as understood by the interviewees). A change only at 
the level of accounting structures and systems was defined as incremental (for instance, in the case 
new RAB systems or performance measures were formally introduced, but these were not actually 
used, agreed upon or understood by those using them). The lack of change in the interviewees’ 
ideas and interpretive schemes, accompanied by fairly minor (if any) changes in the organisation’s 
accounting systems was coded as ‘no change’v (Liguori, 2012b). The analysis of patterns of co-
occurrence between the perceived outcomes (radical, incremental or no change) and areas 
(financial accounting, budgeting, performance management or reform as a whole) of change is 
presented in Table 3, while Tables 4 and 5 present emerging patterns between outcomes of change 
and legitimation strategies. The Appendix provides examples of how the coding scheme was 
applied to the interview transcripts to identify different strategies and change outcomes.  
 
Accounting changes in the UK: setting the context  
The UK consists of four separate countries (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales) 
within one main political unit. Traditionally, government within the UK has been founded on 
concepts such as a unitary state and supremacy of a parliament at Westminster. These ideas have 
been challenged by the process of devolution, this being defined as the transfer to a subordinate 
elected body, on a geographical basis, of functions previously exercised by Westminster ministers 
and the Westminster parliament (Bogdanor, 2001). Since 1999 there have been devolved 
administrations, in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, with these remaining part of the UK 
and Westminster retaining ultimate power. The areas in which the Scottish parliament has 
devolved powers (legislative authority) include health, education, local government, justice and 
agriculture. The UK parliament’s powers, with regards to Scotland, include defence, foreign policy, 
financial and economic matters, energy and medical ethics (Scottish Parliament, 2016).   
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The UK is a common law country and the vast majority of financial accounting, budgeting 
and performance management changes do not pass through law, but rather are implemented via 
administrative acts (for more detail, see Hyndman et al., 2014). This is not to say that specific 
accounting reforms are announced and then implemented without adjustment and in accordance 
with initial timetables. Indeed, often a degree of evolution and shape adjustment takes place 
between initial announcement and the final decided changes. As a result of the managerial reforms 
that took place in the 1990s, accounting systems in all parts of UK central government changed 
considerably. Initially, the UK central government featured: cash budgeting with strict annuality 
requirements, cash accounting, and limited performance measurement and performance 
management. Since then it has progressively moved significantly along a continuum of reform in 
financial accounting, budgeting and performance management (Table 1). The earliest major 
changes were seen with respect to performance management. The Financial Management Initiative 
called for managers in central government to have ‘a clear view of their objectives, and means to 
assess, and wherever possible measure, outputs or performance in relation to those objectives’ 
(HM Government, 1982, p.5). This high-minded aspiration was a recurring theme of the Next 
Steps Initiative, the Citizen’s Charter and developments in education and health care in the 1980s. 
Performance management and reporting were also integral parts of the development of Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) changes in the mid-1990s (see below) and came again to the 
fore in the introduction of Public Service Agreements (PSAs) and Service Delivery Agreements 
(SDAs) in 1998. Central government departments were held accountable for service delivery 
through the targets set out in their PSAs and SDAs. In 2004, SDAs were replaced by performance-
focused Delivery Plans for each department. 
As can be seen in Table 1, since 1980 financial accounting has moved from its traditional 
cash base to a more commercial accruals (or, in the language of RAB, ‘resource’) base. The 
arguments for using the accruals model, in place of cash accounting, gained prominence and a 
move from the cash basis was agreed for central government (see the Green Paper – HM Treasury, 
1994,  followed by the White Paper – HM Treasury, 1995). This was implemented under the title 
of ‘RAB’. In addition, on the management accounting side, a move to resource budgeting, in order 
to make the management accounts align with the external accounts, was made. The position of 
accruals accounting was further embedded by the decision in 1998 to produce Whole of 
Government Accounts (WGA) (a consolidated set of accruals financial statements for the UK 
public sector, consolidating around 1,500 bodies), with the first set of WGA being produced in 
2011. In addition, in 2007, it was announced that the financial statements of public sector 
organisations would be prepared using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS); this 
change was implemented by 2009. 
In the realm of budgeting, major changes have also occurred. As mentioned above (and 
shown in Table 1), the move from cash budgeting to resource (accruals) budgeting was announced 
in the mid-1990s (‘live’ by 2003). In addition, annuality (the requirement of budget allocations to 
be spent by the financial year-end or be surrendered) was abolished in 1997 at the central 
government departmental level, with end-year flexibility (EYF) being permitted (allowing the carry 
forward of unspent resources from one year to the next). However, as a consequence of financial 
pressures, this flexibility was removed in 2011. To provide greater long-term focus, in 1998, 
Treasury-led spending reviews were initiated to set firm and fixed spending budgets over several 
years for each government department rather than rely on single-period budgeting. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Variations in Scotland 
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Up until the late 1990s the UK operated as a very centralised state, with substantial powers 
exercised by the Westminster parliament in London. However, since 1999, Scotland has had a 
devolved parliament with full legislative competence, that is to say it holds primary legislative 
powers and potentially the power to legislate in any non-reserved area of policy. In preparing for 
devolution, a series of consultation working parties was organised by the then Secretary of State 
for Scotland. One of these groups was the Financial Issues Advisory Group (FIAG), which was 
given the remit of reporting on how best the new Scottish parliament could exercise budgetary 
control. While the majority of UK financial accounting rules and changes also applied to Scotland, 
the FIAG observed that it would not be appropriate for the Scottish parliament to merely adopt 
the existing practices of budgetary scrutiny of the UK parliament at Westminster (Scottish Office, 
1998). It highlighted that the main objective of the budgetary system of the new Scottish 
parliament should be related to transparency. The mechanism to achieve this, advocated by FIAG 
and adopted by the Scottish parliament, was a three stage process through: scrutiny of strategic 
priorities for expenditure; examination of the draft budget; and approval of the expenditure plans 
in the budget documents.  
In terms of performance management, Scotland experienced similar influences as the rest 
of the UK prior to devolution. Subsequently, while the focus on such has been at least as intense 
as in the rest of the UK, the manner in which it has been applied has been different. Perhaps the 
most notable outworking of this was seen in the Scottish spending review of 2007, which 
introduced a NPF. The NPF, inspired by a model developed by the state of Virginia in the USA, 
aims to provide a single framework with a ten-year vision and based on delivering outcomes, rather 
than inputs and outputs that improve the quality of life for people in Scotland (Scottish 
Government, 2011).  
Finally, despite Scotland having responsibility for the allocation of their budget and a 
distinctive performance management approach, overall financial arrangements for accounting and 
reporting need ‘to be consistent with the Whitehall regime for planning and controlling public 
expenditure’ (Lapsley and Midwinter, 2008, p.78). Thus, when Westminster introduced RAB, the 
Scottish parliament followed suit. Similarly, Westminster’s decision to introduce EYF in 1997 was 
also applicable to Scotland. Similarly, the abolition of EYF and its replacement with the Budget 
Exchange system was applicable to Scotland (HM Treasury, 2011). There has been a large degree 
of convergence on the main financial accounting and budgeting processes used by both the 
Westminster and Scottish parliaments. Where divergences have occurred, these have mainly 
related to the more fine-grained application of devolved responsibilities, rather than the main tools 
of planning and control, and their related accounting instruments, utilised within the UK as a 
whole.   
 
Legitimation of accounting changes in Westminster  
Overall, the majority of Westminster interviewees were accountants, often with private sector 
experience (two out of four interviewees in WF; five out of 14 in WD) before joining central 
government. In WF, the interviewees mainly referred to strictly financial accounting changes (such 
as the introduction of accruals accounting or WGA) during their interviews, with much lower 
emphasis on budgeting issues and, especially, on performance management. When discussing the 
different areas of accounting change, WF concentrated strongly on legitimation rather than 
delegitimation strategies. As can be seen in Table 2 (which shows numbers and percentages of 
legitimation/delegitimation strategies per organisational level and government, Westminster and 
Scotland shown separately), delegitimation strategies (AUT2, NAR2, NOR2, PAT2 and RAT2) 
were only mentioned in 47 cases out of 315 counts (about 15% of all the cases). In other words, 
changes were largely interpreted through positive statements and with limited opposition. In terms 
of legitimation, the most-frequently employed strategy concerned rationalisation (RAT1 24.4%, 
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Table 2), followed by authorisation (AUT1 22.2%). With respect to rationalisation, the 
interviewees reflected on the need for the new forms of account to support upward 
communication (to politicians) and within-department communication (to managers) as a basis for 
discussion and better decisions, in particular when talking about RAB. This strategy, especially in 
the form of effective planning, also represents the most used in Westminster generally (28.4%, 
Table 2). Interestingly, delegitimating strategies linked to rationality (RAT2) accounted for only 
5.7% of the cases in WF. This was not particularly with respect to the unsuitability of specific 
individual tools, but largely in relation to implementation problems connected to the initial 
misalignment between financial accounting and budgeting systems.  
 In the case of authorisation, the main source of authority referred to was political or 
government. Authority was seen to be pushing or supporting the changes, and, in most cases, 
seemed to be appreciated (perhaps viewed as providing welcomed back-up to accounting changes 
that were considered ‘rational’ or ‘normal’ by the WF interviewees). One interviewee, who had 
lived through the change process since the early 1990s, commented with respect to the authority 
of government and internal management in 2010 (when a New Labour government was replaced 
by a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition) and 1997 (when a Conservative government was 
replaced by New Labour): 
“With the changes in government, we’ve been very fortunate with both Resource Accounting and Clear Line 
of Sight. The changes in government have not created problems. With the Clear Line of Sight, we actually 
spent time talking to the shadow treasury team before the introduction. We’re obviously going to seek their 
agreement. With Resource Accounting and Budgeting, in fact, the RAB reforms fitted perfectly with what 
the new government wanted to do in terms of moving to multi-year budgeting, in terms of resource DEL 
[department expenditure limit] control and so on.” WF1 
 
  Normalisation arguments were also presented relatively frequently within WF (NOR1 
being 11.1%, Table 2). In the interviews, normalisation was often related to the role professionals 
play because of their specialised training and active involvement in networks, and how they 
influence what were viewed as appropriate processes and behaviours. There is evidence that many 
of the accounting (particularly financial accounting) changes that had been introduced were viewed 
as positive because they related to ‘what was professional’ or what ‘was done in the private sector’. 
In addition, WF, like the generality of Westminster interviewees, made extensive use of narratives 
and stories to describe and assess the changes. This evidence may have been strengthened by their 
long-term experience in all the three areas of accounting change, where the first experimentations 
were carried out already in the 1980s. This allowed the senior interviewees to expand on their 
answers, and provide enriched opinions, especially through the recollection of past events. Finally, 
it is worth noting the WF interviewees were relatively emotionally connected to the changes, with 
positive pathos strategies (PAT1) utilised in 7.3% of cases (Table 2). This percentage is much 
higher than in WD, where pathos was rarely found. The difference between the central finance 
function and the other departments regarding pathos may have reflected the fact that WF was, to 
an extent, the persuader and implementer of the accounting changes, whereas the other 
departments merely had the changes ‘imposed’ upon them. For example, one WF interviewee 
discussing the internal management and civil servants’ commitment to the overall reform process: 
“I think it [RAB] moved through Treasury. I’m sure he [Andrew Likiermanvi] must have had senior 
support behind him at a political level as well as at civil-service level. If you had the inertia of very senior civil 
servants, it wouldn’t have happened. There must have been a desire above Andrew, behind Andrew that was 
making it happen. Everything that came to me came through Andrew. He would be very encouraging and 
have a very good handling on what was happening. He generated the support and the belief in everything. It 
must have also been coming from groups of politicians and groups of very senior civil servants. It couldn’t have 
happened otherwise.” WF2 
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Also at the operational level (WD), financial accounting was the frequently referenced area 
of change. This was even in cases where interviewees had no previous private-sector experience. 
When looking at the legitimation strategies in WD, the main strategy used was rationalisation 
(Table 2). Indeed, 30% of the arguments made were expressed on a RAT1 basis, and were 
especially related to the importance of economic logic, effective planning and control (especially 
with respect to resources), and optimal choice:  
 “I think it [RAB] was to demonstrate costs in and around each department because before that we weren’t; 
we were only thinking about the cash costs. You weren’t ever thinking about any non-cash elements before.” 
WD7 
 
Interestingly, delegitimation was also often related to rationalisation (WD: RAT2, 7.5%, 
the highest among the delegitimation strategies, Table 2) and occurred much more frequently than 
in WF. Staff in WD had more doubts about the actual meaning of what they were doing and the 
changes they were implementing. As a consequence, changes were more often perceived as 
authority-based and imposed. The second most-used strategy in WD was authorisation, especially 
with reference to the role played by WF and government. For instance, when referring to CLOS, 
and on being asked about who was promoting the change:  
“Treasury tell us and then we ask how high they would like us to jump.” WD1 
  
“Change comes pretty much from the centre, which is either Treasury or the Cabinet Office. Parliament also 
I think. Parliament pushed CLOS through. They were fed up with getting three different reports... and every 
one of those is correct. And parliament, I think, just got fed up with all the smoke and mirrors and the 
constant trying to reconcile between the three to get facts.” WD2 
 
 Narrativisation was widely used by WD interviewees to legitimate change (Table 2). In 
addition, possibly reflecting the interviewees’ relatively more extensive public-sector backgrounds, 
the use of normalisation strategies here was much lower than in WF (NOR1 6.6%, Table 2). 
Finally, differently from WF, pathos arguments were almost totally absent in the WD responses 
(Table 2). The further the actors implementing the changes were from the centre (where changes 
had been decided), the less committed and personally involved they appeared to be. While 
decisions regarding the changes could be viewed as political, interactions between politicians and 
WF to shape them, and the charging of WF to implement them, resulted in a degree of emotional 
attachment in WF. This was missing in the operationally-focused departments.  
   
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Finally, the analysis of the outcome of change (as emerging from the interviewees’ 
perceptions) produces an interesting picture across the two organisational levels. While some of 
the changes were identifiable as being incremental (where modifications were made to structures 
and systems, but not interpretative schemes), others were perceived as more radical (involving a 
shift in both structures/systems and interpretive schemes). In very few cases were the accounting 
changes considered as resulting in no real change at all. Radical changes affecting behaviours and 
everyday life were often viewed as being pushed into the system through authority, but were also 
very frequently seen as rational and helpful. Considering the overall Westminster case (excluding 
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references to the reform process as a whole), budgeting, followed by financial accounting, changes 
were seen more often as radical (Table 3). Not only the formal accounting structures were 
introduced, but also the relative interpretive schemes changed consistently, with people agreeing 
with the new managerial values, recognising the usefulness of the new systems, such as accruals 
accounting, and using them in their day-to-day decision making. For example, with respect to RAB:  
“Budgeting has been improved. I think there is more genuine information coming out. If you just use cash 
accounting, you are only capturing a certain amount of information. If you use accrual accounting, you are 
adding another dimension. I spent my career based on the assumption that good communication is important 
and communication has got better.” WF2 
 
and  
“Accounting was very much silos in that we had some experts, a couple of people, who knew the rules in 
budgeting, and they were like a breed of themselves. The accounting was done up here completely separate, 
and it was disjointed... Now over time with the CLOS project... it has made it more public, so that people 
understand that they need to be interested in how things are accounted for, and how things are treated in the 
budgetary framework.” WD1 
 
 Performance management, however, was often seen as positive by WD. For example, one 
WD interviewee argued that the move to performance management, through the embedding of 
PSAs and SDAs in the planning and accountability processes, and the development of multi-period 
planning processes, had far more impact than financial accounting changes. Interestingly, in higher 
education, and perhaps as a consequence of the REF, the most contentious change appeared to 
be relating to performance management (also referring to SDAs and PSAs). The interviewees 
recalled that the impetus to introduce and revise performance measures almost always came from 
the centre, and, as part of this process, WF often sought negotiation and consultation about details. 
Nevertheless, doubts about their actual implementation and meaning still remained, often leading 
to the perception of a change that was only formal (at the level of structures, rather than ideas and 
behaviours) and incremental: 
“It [resource budgeting] can be affected by things outside of departmental control, the macroeconomic 
position; it’s a highly significant feature of managing our overall budget and managing our overall relationship 
with the Treasury. People are not convinced; it is contentious” WD12 
  
 The use of certain legitimation strategies, and especially seeing accounting change as a 
‘rational thing to do’, appears related to the perceptions of the outcome of change. Table 4 details 
the co-occurrence between the perceived outcomes and the legitimation strategies in Westminster 
at the two organisational levels. It shows that at both levels (WF and WD), rationalisation strategies 
were used more often than authorisation ones, and changes were identified more frequently as 
radical (especially as far as financial accounting and budgeting were concerned). This suggests that 
legitimation through authority is necessary but not sufficient to foster radical change, as people 
first of all need to make sense of the change as being ‘rational’ and ‘sensible’. Consistent with this 
line of reasoning, in Westminster, patterns of incremental change seem to be associated with a 
stronger use of legitimation through authorisation (AUT1 reaching similar levels as RAT1, Table 
4) and delegitimation based on rationalisation (e.g. lack of resources, skills, or culture; this being 
14.1% in WF and 22.8% in WD, Table 4) and pathos (18.8% in WF and 5.3% in WD; PAT2 not 
present in cases of radical change).  
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Insert Tables 3 and 4 here 
 
Legitimation of accounting changes: a comparison with Scotland 
In terms of legitimation strategies, SF, perhaps unsurprisingly, differed from its immediate 
Westminster counterpart (WF): here, indeed, the interviewees made greater use of authorisation 
strategies (AUT1 representing 25.3% of the strategies used, Table 2). While the main authority 
mentioned by SF interviewees was usually the Scottish government (and ministers), they also often 
combined this with reference to the role played by WF in determining their overall resources and, 
often, accounting policies (such as in the case of RAB and WGA). For instance: 
“The policy is devolved so ministers can set their own statutes, their own outcomes, and these sorts of things. 
We just have to make sure we don’t overspend and we send regular information to Treasury [WF]. We’ve 
built up a level of credibility with Treasury that what we say, we do. Our forecasts are pretty close to where 
we come out and we have all the same risk assessments too.” SF1 
 
In SF, rationalisation and narrativisation both represented 22% of the strategies employed 
to describe the changes (Table 2). Interestingly, and again different from what was highlighted by 
WF interviewees, normalisation and pathos arguments were much less present. This could have a 
twofold explanation. On the one hand, although most interviewees in both Westminster and 
Scotland were accountants, this was relatively less the case in Scotland. In addition, fewer in 
Scotland had private sector experience (half in both SF and SD). This may have (negatively) 
impacted on their perceptions of the importance of professional standards and rules. On the other 
hand, with the exception of the NPF, SF did not appear to feel ownership for the changes 
introduced, which were usually perceived as being driven from Westminster (for example, RAB, 
EYF and WGA). As a consequence, lower levels of personal and organisational commitment (i.e. 
pathos strategies) were present. Consistently, delegitimation strategies emerged much more often 
here than in Westminster. Delegitimation was mainly brought forward through rational arguments 
(RAT2, Table 2), followed by negative stories and examples (NAR2), and critiques of the main 
authority figures (especially WF). For instance, criticising the rationale behind EYF and agreeing 
with Treasury’s decision to remove it in 2011 (joint use of NAR2, RAT2 and AUT1): 
“Treasury said, ‘Well there’s end-year flexibility, you can’t just assume you can pull down what you want, 
when you want’. So they brought in a control and said, in that particular year, that there would be a certain 
fixed amount that you could access. I mean, it was still pretty generous but it was different to what people 
were expecting, they could just ‘willy-nilly’ access resources before. It was so relaxed; it was unbelievable!” 
SF1  
 
and criticising WF and Whitehall (AUT2) in relation to the overall reform: 
“We were able to have a system here where the main finance people supporting the portfolios actually are a 
part of the line management arrangement within my team, so you didn’t quite end up with the problems you 
get dealing with the Treasury and finance people in Whitehall departments.” SF2 
 
Similar statements were not unusual in SF, where a form of “rivalry” towards the fellow 
accountants in Westminster (as opposed to Scotland as a devolved administration) was often 
identifiable.   
In the Scottish operationally-focused departments (SD), narrativisation, authorisation and 
rationalisation were by far the most-used legitimation strategies, with narrativisation occurring 
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slightly more often than the other two (Table 2). Authorisation arguments made particular 
reference to the role of the EU, followed by government policies decided in both Scotland and 
Westminster, while rationalisation stressed efficiency and effectiveness in both the management 
of activities and resources. For instance, with reference to financial reporting and European 
regulations: 
“The additional demands are effectively from Europe in terms of what they are reporting…the requirements 
are to make sure you satisfy all of those regulations. We have to generate duplicate activities that the core 
financial systems should be able to do for us but there is significant investment in terms of new management 
information systems to cope with the new agricultural programme.” SD2 
 
Speaking of the reasons relating to the introduction of performance management changes 
(and NPF), on the basis of rationalisation arguments: 
 
 Compared to SF, SD interviewees made more pronounced use of delegitimation strategies 
based on rational arguments (RAT2, 10.08% vs. 9.30% in SF, Table 2), mainly with reference to 
financial accounting and budgeting changes. For instance, when speaking about WGA: 
“I can see the, you know, the aspiration in trying to get a cohesive look at the whole of the government picture; 
but I don’t know what anyone could realistically use the information for.” SD1 
 
Overall, delegitimation strategies represented about 21% of the total in Scotland, compared 
to 14% in Westminster (Table 2); Scottish interviewees were, thus, overall more critical of the 
accounting reforms put in place over the past 20 years. Finally, compared to Westminster, in 
Scotland change was more often identifiable as incremental, i.e. new accounting systems were 
implemented, but these were interpreted through the old, bureaucratic interpretive schemes and 
little understood (Table 3). For instance, discussing the formal implementation of RAB, and 
stressing that people were not actually ready and equipped for it: 
“Arguably we were focused on a ‘go-live’ date and whether we were actually ready to go live on that date may 
be moot. We went ‘live’ arguably not really ready, there were a whole raft of issues that arose because of that.” 
SD5 
 
This picture is consistent with the more frequent use of delegitimation strategies (especially 
through rationalisation, narrativisation, pathos and authorisation) that emerged in the devolved 
Scottish administration. As far as radical change in concerned, although SF interviewees indicated 
it more often than those in SD, at all levels this was mostly linked to the Scottish NPF (different 
from Westminster, where radical change was most often identifiable in respect of budgeting). For 
instance, in relation to the extent of change brought about by the NPF and its effect on daily 
decision making: 
“I would genuinely say that since the introduction of the National Performance Framework, 2007, so what, 
about six years ago, I think during that time in government, that’s been the single biggest change that I have 
seen in terms of how we think about policy and how we think about delivery of policy. I think before that, it 
was very much about inputs and outputs.” SF5  
 
and  
“It [performance management] has changed hugely. It used to be focused on inputs. What does money 
buy us in terms of teachers, hospitals or hospital beds? But now we are much more focused on outcomes and 
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outputs. Outcomes ideally, but we will settle for outputs.... There has been a big shift from this input-based 
to more output, and you have heard of this National Performance Framework which has indicators to focus 
more on the outcomes. That is probably the biggest change.” SD4 
 
There was a greater ownership felt by the interviewees for a tool (the NPF) that had been 
specifically crafted by the Scottish government to meet their information needs; a tool that 
embodied signs of the autonomy the departments have in managing and controlling their daily 
activities.  
Table 5 details the co-occurrence between the perceived outcomes of change and the 
legitimation strategies in the Scottish departments and helps identify possible patterns between the 
use of legitimation strategies and the perceived outcome of change. Two patterns, in particular, 
seem to emerge also in the Scottish case. Despite the relatively lower evidence of radical change 
that could be found in the Scottish interviews (38% of the arguments made vs. 55% in 
Westminster, Table 3), radical change was, like in Westminster (but here even more clearly), mainly 
associated with the actors’ more frequent use of rationalisation (37.4% of the times radical change 
was identifiable in SF and 36.6% in SD, Table 5), rather than authorisation, strategies. Conversely, 
when legitimation was mainly based on authorisation arguments (rather than rationalisation ones) 
and occurred jointly with delegitimation, based on both pathos (9.6% in SF and 11% in SD, Table 
5) and rationalisation (19.1% in SF and 24.4% in SD), incremental change was more often 
identifiable; this was similar to the case in Westminster.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Legitimating change at different government levels 
As indicated, the vast majority of Westminster interviewees were professional accountants. This is 
fairly typical of what has been happening in the UK public sector with respect to accounting 
changes over the past decades, with private-sector trained professional accountants often recruited 
to support the implementation and operation of the new accounting systems (Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2006a and 2006b; Christensen and Parker, 2010). The professionalisation experience is 
likely to have influenced perceptions and the way in which actors’ see accounting changes. 
Although most of the interviewees in Scotland also had an accounting background, these were 
relatively fewer. This may have impacted on their perceptions and can explain some of the 
differences found both in the strategies used and in the perceived change at the level of interpretive 
schemes. Moreover, while previous literature suggested the presence of strong professional 
identities and rivalries during accounting change (typically between public versus private sector 
accountants and between accountants and other professional groups, Ellwood and Newberry, 
2007; Jones, 2000; Christensen and Parker, 2010), this study does not find evidence for this. Rather, 
it shows that the involvement of professional accountants in the reforms of both Westminster and 
Scotland favoured the development of a different form of ‘rivalry’ between two different groups 
(central versus devolved administration) of accountants.   
In Westminster, comparing the use of legitimation strategies at both organisational levels, 
the changes were mainly seen positively and in terms of rationalisation. This provides further 
evidence of the UK as being a leader and strong supporter of managerial reforms in the public 
sector. Consistently with the high number of accountants present, normalisation strategies and 
profession-based arguments were used at both organisational levels (although to a greater extent 
in WF). Here, the changes were first justified and their implementation throughout the whole 
government planned. Differently, in Scotland, there were frequent references to sources of 
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authority that were not only local (such as the Scottish government and parliament), but also UK-
based (WF and the Westminster government) and supranational (like the EU). These multiple 
layers and levels of government continuously interacting are likely to have influenced the 
interviewees’ perceptions in terms of ‘who is really pushing the change’; in addition, it strengthened 
the role of authorisation strategies when compared to Westminster. Consistent with this 
interpretation and with the search for a greater local identity mirrored in the exaltation of the NPF 
(performance management being the area of change largely identifiable as radical), in Scotland a 
stronger role played by delegitimation strategies was also evident.  
In terms of significance, or outcome, of change, looking across the two levels of 
government, consistent patterns emerge between this and the legitimation strategies used to make 
sense of the changes. Patterns emerge, in particular, for radical and incremental change. In both 
Westminster and Scotland, radical change is associated with the presence and prevalent use of 
arguments that link back to authorisation and rationalisation strategies to interpret the changes. 
Rationalisation first, and then authorisation, seem to be necessary for radical change to be 
identified (see Table 4 and 5). Incremental change appears, instead, characterised by both weak 
legitimation based on rationality and strong delegitimation, which counterbalances and more than 
offsets the efforts for change. The use of delegitimation strategies through the means of pathos 
and rationalisation arguments, in particular, hampers the change in people’s interpretive schemes, 
tying them to old ways of doing things. It is interesting to note that these patterns emerge 
consistently across organisational levels and different levels of government, regardless of the 
interviewees’ background (which was more accounting-related in the finance departments, much 
less so in the operational ones).  
Finally, it is worth highlighting that legitimation through narrativisation emerged for all the 
outcomes of change. Each of the interviewees utilised mostly positive and constructive stories 
(rather than critiques and caveats) when discussing change, even in cases when the final perceived 
outcome may have been merely cosmetic. Perhaps surprisingly when compared to previous studies 
(Covaleski et al., 2003; Green, 2004; Vaara et al., 2006), in the respondents’ minds moralisation 
strategies seemed to be little associated with the implementation and achievement of any kind of 
accounting change. On the one hand, this may suggest that, in this context and contrary to their 
use elsewhere, accounting changes are largely seen as value neutral and rational, and not particularly 
related to bigger ‘moral’ questions such as appropriateness of service provision and transparency 
of the organisation. On the other hand, this finding could be explained by the fact that certain 
issues, such as ‘good governance’ and ‘transparency’, may be inbuilt in the public-sector mindset, 
taken for granted, and thus not in need of mention/justification in the interviewees’ minds.  
 
Conclusions 
This study aimed to improve our understanding of how new accounting techniques are 
implemented and translated at different organisational and government levels. It explored how 
accounting changes are argued for, and, by focusing on Westminster and Scotland, how this relates 
to the perceived outcome of change. Results show that the way organisational actors make sense 
of changes and legitimate them is strongly associated with the extent to which the actor’s 
interpretive schemes are influenced.  
While previous literature suggests that different actors tend to use the same rhetorical 
sequences during successive periods of change, a more fine-grained analysis suggests that in the 
UK (Westminster and Scotland) different legitimation strategies were used at each of the 
organisational levels, with rationalisation and authorisation strategies dominating. The study shows 
that changes in accounting, originally introduced to enhance ‘rational’ management and business-
like/managerial decision making, were often received as being strongly pushed by some source of 
‘authority’. Both the central implementers (WF and SF), who first received the political ideas and 
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interpreted them for organisational adoption, and the more operationally-focussed departments 
(WD and SD), tended to provide positive (legitimating) justifications for modifications to the 
systems. The relatively more frequent use of pathos in WF may reflect its central position in the 
general UK-government landscape and the more direct connection and involvement of WF in the 
design of the changes. This is particularly evident when considering the greater use of negative 
(delegitimating) strategies made in the devolved administration; indeed, in Scotland, most of the 
changes (with the notable exception of NPF) were perceived as ‘centrally imposed’ by 
Westminster. Finally, in Westminster, and even more so in Scotland, the interviewees made 
substantial recourse to stories (i.e. narrativisation) to justify the changes. 
Radical change (involving a shift in both structures and systems and interpretive schemes) 
was perceived more often in Westminster than in Scotland. This may be influenced by the different 
level of government considered and the different perceptions the interviewees had in terms of 
their autonomy in setting out and implementing change. Moreover, the line-departmental actors 
who did not decide the changes, but were left to engage with them and modify their everyday 
activities in response, tended to perceive change as much more significant and ground-breaking 
than those planning and shaping itfrom the centre. Overall, and regardless of the interviewees’ 
background and organisational level, the results suggest that radical change is more likely to take 
place when change is perceived, primarily, as rational and ‘sensible’, rather than merely driven by 
authorisation-related pressures. A certain level of authorisation, however, is important to justify 
the change and make it happen. In short, legitimation through authority is necessary but not 
sufficient to foster radical change. While authorisation is needed to implement the new systems 
and structures, rationalisation is essential to facilitate change at the level of interpretive schemes. 
Consistent with this interpretation, incremental change (where modifications are made to 
structures and systems, but not the interpretative schemes) is, instead, associated with relatively 
modest legitimation via rationalisation, and with delegitimation through the means of pathos and 
rationalisation. 
 This paper offers a threefold contribution to previous literature and theory. First, existing 
studies often struggle to explain organisations’ heterogeneity and practice variation and, in many 
cases, accounting has been assumed to converge towards the adoption of common practices 
(Lounsbury, 2001; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). This study sheds more light on how individuals 
within organisations may legitimate accounting change and, ultimately, affect its significance within 
the organisation itself. It proposes a relationship between the legitimation strategies used to 
interpret change and its outcome, distinguishing between the level of structure and systems and 
interpretive schemes. How legitimation strategies may affect the reproduction and outcome of 
generally accepted changes has been little investigated in the past. The evidence presented here 
shows a relationship between strategies used and perceived significance of change, engaging in a 
finer-grained investigation than previously conducted. Second, the study investigates change and 
legitimation not only across organisational levels, but also at different government levels, looking 
at the Westminster government and the Scottish devolved administration. Different from previous 
literature (Green, 2004), the paper highlights variations in the way actors in similar organisational 
positions (and with similar background) interpret the same changes; these differences are mainly 
based on their hierarchical position (central versus devolved administration) and on the ownership 
they perceive of the changes being implemented (in the case of Scotland, much more felt for the 
NPF). The relative lack of ‘pathos’ in Scotland is likely to have influenced the limited perception 
of radical change. Third, the majority of previous accounting studies on accounting change have 
been undertaken using an organisational focus, rather than an individual one (Laughlin, 1991; 
Broadbent, 1992; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Liguori and Steccolini, 2012; Contrafatto and Burns, 
2013). Although these studies tend to agree that radical change is more likely to occur when 
changes are amenable to actual and shared justification, this research highlights the active role 
played by organisational actors in understanding and implementing change, and explores the 
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individual legitimations that can provide such justification. It is important to highlight that 
individual rhetorical strategies and legitimations of change may, and indeed are likely to, be 
different from the official justification that the organisation provides for the introduction of a new 
practice. 
 From a managerial perspective, it is suggested that, to implement and eventually achieve 
radical change, those charged with implementing change need to realise that those affected, and 
ultimately involved in operating the new systems, have to see any adjustments as, at the very 
minimum, logical and sensible (rational) and as being promoted by those having the authority to 
do so. Moreover, radical change is more likely to occur if managers have a degree of commitment 
(pathos) to the change. Training and education are therefore at the core. In terms of policy 
implications, the study informs public-policy makers regarding linkages between new systems and 
already existing ones. The research shows that extant accounting approaches have long-established 
validity and are largely taken-for-granted; therefore it is important to consider the interaction 
between new and old tools when designing and introducing new accounting reforms. It is likely 
that any proposed abandonment, or criticism, of valued older techniques will hamper the 
successful implementation of new ones. In order to reduce resistance to change, the integration of 
new ideas into existing frameworks should be handled carefully, through appropriate, interactive, 
training and communication (thus impacting on people’s understanding and interpretive schemes).     
 As with all empirical studies, this research also has its limitations. Firstly, the study deals 
with organisational actors’ legitimation strategies and perceptions of change. While such 
perceptions are likely to be strongly correlated with the significance of change (however defined), 
detailed studies of systems and actions, resulting from the use of new tools and techniques, could 
provide further insights. Secondly, taken-for-granted issues and ideas may often remain ‘under the 
radar’, as not using certain words could also mean that the information is assumed and does not 
need to be stated (Green, 2004). Thirdly, the focus of the empirical study is on the UK, an early 
and strong reform initiator when compared to others. Other studies comparing different countries, 
possibly with differing administrative cultures and traditions, would enrich the findings. Further 
research could also investigate how legitimation strategies enable actors to establish and exercise 
different power relationships during processes of change. More studies on the relationship 
between outcomes and areas of change are also needed to explore how specific changes may be 
embedded into different organisations and cultures.   
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Tables 
Table 1 – Main accounting changes in the UK central government systems 
 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Performance 
management 
1982 - Focus on performance management in 
Financial Management Initiative.  
1988 - Intensification of performance focus with 
the introduction of the Next Steps Initiative and 
the creation of Executive Agencies. 
1994-1995 - Announced that Statements of 
Resources by Departmental Aims and Objectives 
to be introduced in all government departments as 
part of the Resource Accounting and Budgeting 
(RAB) changes. 
1998 - Performance-focused Public Service 
Agreements and Service Delivery Agreements 
(SDAs) introduced as a key-aspect of quasi-
contracts between the Treasury and government 
departments. 
 
2001 - Statements of Resources by Departmental 
Aims and Objectives required to be produced as 
part of the RAB changes in all central government 
departments.  
2004 - SDAs replaced by Delivery Plans for each 
government department.  
 
 
Financial 
Accounting 
1980 - Largely cash based and mainly focusing on 
cash received and cash spent.  
 
1994-1995 - Announced that resource (accruals) 
accounting to be introduced in all government 
departments as part of the RAB changes. 
1998 - Treasury first published a scoping study for 
Whole of Government Accounts (WGA).  
2001 - Resource (accruals) accounting ‘live’ in all 
central government departments. 
2007 - Announced that financial accounting of 
government departments to be based on 
International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). 
2009 - Financial accounting of government 
departments on basis of IFRS.   
2011 - First set of WGA.   
 
Budgeting 1980 - Based on cash and principle of annuality.  
 
1994-1995 - Announced that resource (accruals) 
budgeting to be introduced in all government 
departments as part of the RAB changes.  
1997 - End-year flexibility (EYF) introduced with 
respect to budget carry forward. 
1998 - Treasury-led spending reviews initiated to 
set firm and fixed spending budgets over several 
years for each government department. 
2003 - Resource (accruals) budgeting ‘live’ in all 
central government departments.  
2007 – ‘Clear Line of Sight’ (CLOS) project 
commenced aimed at getting better alignment of 
accounting and budgeting information.  
2011 - EYF system abolished due to financial 
pressures (replaced by a system of Budget 
Exchange). 
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Table 2 – Legitimation (and delegitimation) strategies in Westminster and Scotland 
WESTMINSTER 
  AUT1 AUT2 MOR1 MOR2 NAR1 NAR2 NOR1 NOR2 PAT1 PAT2 RAT1 RAT2 Total counts 
WF 
22.2% 1.9% 0.3% 0.00% 19.7% 2.9% 11.1% 0.3% 7.3% 4.1% 24.4% 5.7% 100% 
70 6 1 0 62 9 35 1 23 13 77 18 315 
WD 
26.6% 1.6% 3.8% 0.00% 18.8% 2.1% 6.6% 0.4% 0.6% 2.1% 30.0% 7.5% 100% 
205 12 29 0 145 16 51 3 5 16 231 58 771 
Total counts 
25.3% 1.7% 2.8% 0.00% 19.1% 2.3% 7.9% 0.4% 2.6% 2.7% 28.4% 7.0% 100% 
275 18 30 0 207 25 86 4 28 29 308 76 1086 
SCOTLAND 
  AUT1 AUT2 MOR1 MOR2 NAR1 NAR2 NOR1 NOR2 PAT1 PAT2 RAT1 RAT2 Total counts 
SF 
25.3% 3.4% 2.0% 0.3% 22.0% 3.9% 6.0% 0.4% 2.3% 2.9% 22.0% 9.3% 100% 
173 23 14 2 151 27 41 3 16 20 151 64 685 
SD 
22.4% 2.7% 2.9% 0.0% 23.3% 4.2% 6.3% 0.9% 0.9% 3.5% 22.9% 10.1% 100% 
149 18 19 0 155 28 42 6 6 23 152 67 665 
Total counts 
23.9% 3.0% 2.4% 0.1% 22.7% 4.1% 6.1% 0.7% 1.6% 3.2% 22.4% 9.7% 100% 
322 41 33 2 306 55 83 9 22 43 303 131 1350 
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Table 3 – Accounting change: perceived outcome by area of change in Westminster and Scotland 
Change outcome → 
Radical Incremental No change 
Counts 
% 
Area of accounting change ↓ Westminster 
FIN ACC 
52.5% 43.4% 4.0% 100% 
52 43 4 99 
BDGT 
58.1% 34.4% 7.5% 100% 
54 32 7 93 
PM 
48.6% 45.7% 5.7% 100% 
17 16 2 35 
Whole reform 
64.0% 36.0% 0.0% 100% 
16 9 0 25 
Westminster 55% 40% 5% 100% 
Overall count 139 100 13 252 
Area of accounting change ↓ Scotland 
FIN ACC 
33.0% 65.0% 2.0% 100% 
33 65 2 100 
BDGT 
31.9% 64.6% 3.5% 100% 
36 73 4 113 
PM 
54.9% 45.1% 0.0% 100% 
28 23 0 51 
Whole reform 
57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 100% 
12 9 0 21 
Scotland 38% 60% 2% 100% 
Overall count 109 170 6 285 
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Table 4 – Co-occurrences of perceived accounting change outcomes and legitimation strategies in Westminster 
Strategy → 
AUT1 AUT2 MOR1 NAR1 NAR2 NOR1 NOR2 PAT1 PAT2 RAT1 RAT2 
Counts 
Change 
outcome ↓ 
% 
WF (n) 
Radical 
13.0% 0.0% 0.0% 26.1% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 52.2% 2.2% 100% 
6 0 0 12 0 2 0 1 0 24 1 46 
Incremental 
14.1% 3.1% 0.0% 15.6% 7.8% 6.3% 0.0% 4.7% 18.8% 15.6% 14.1% 100% 
9 2 0 10 5 4 0 3 12 10 9 64 
No change 
33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 100% 
2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 6 
Overall count 17 2 
               
-    23 6 6 
               
-    5 12 35 10 116 
WF 14.7% 1.7% 0.0% 19.8% 5.2% 5.2% 0.0% 4.3% 10.3% 30.2% 8.6% 100% 
Change 
outcome↓ WD 
Radical 
13.8% 0.0% 4.6% 26.2% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 46.9% 2.3% 100% 
18 0 6 34 0 5 0 3 0 61 3 130 
Incremental 
15.8% 1.8% 3.5% 19.3% 8.8% 3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 19.3% 22.8% 100% 
9 1 2 11 5 2 0 0 3 11 13 57 
No change 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 100% 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 6 
Overall count 27 1 8 46 5 7 0 3 4 72 20 193 
WD 14% 0.5% 4.1% 23.8% 2.6% 3.6% 0.0% 1.6% 2.1% 37.3% 10.4% 100% 
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Table 5 – Co-occurrences of perceived accounting change outcomes and legitimation strategies in Scotland 
Strategy → 
AUT1 AUT2 MOR1 MOR2 NAR1 NAR2 NOR1 
NOR
2 PAT1 PAT2 RAT1 RAT2 
Counts 
Change 
outcome ↓ 
% 
SF (n) 
Radical 
17.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.0% 31.8% 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 6.5% 0.0% 37.4% 0.9% 100% 
19 1 1 0 34 0 4 0 7 0 40 1 107 
Incremental 
19.1% 5.1% 1.5% 0.7% 12.5% 11.0% 3.7% 0.7% 0.7% 9.6% 16.2% 19.1% 100% 
26 7 2 1 17 15 5 1 1 13 22 26 136 
No change 
50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
SF 18.8% 3.7% 1.2% 0.4% 20.8% 6.1% 3.7% 0.4% 3.3% 5.3% 25.3% 11.0% 100% 
Overall count 46 9 3 1 51 15 9 1 8 13 62 27 245 
Change 
outcome↓ SD 
Radical 
18.3% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 24.7% 0.0% 4.3% 1.1% 5.4% 0.0% 36.6% 5.4% 100% 
17 0 4 0 23 0 4 1 5 0 34 5 93 
Incremental 
15.7% 0.8% 1.6% 0.0% 11.8% 16.5% 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 11.0% 11.8% 24.4% 100% 
20 1 2 0 15 21 8 0 0 14 15 31 127 
No change 
16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 100% 
1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 
SD 16.8% 0.4% 2.7% 0.0% 17.7% 9.3% 5.3% 0.4% 2.2% 6.6% 22.1% 16.4% 100% 
Overall count 38 1 6 0 40 21 12 1 5 15 50 37 226 
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Appendix 
Coding scheme and examples of quotations 
Outcome of 
change 
Examples of quotations/area of change (identifying interviewee) 
Radical 
“They embrace that [RAB] now in the knowledge that it comes with implications. They ask the right questions about this and those factors will be taken into consideration in how they are 
going to deploy it.” (WF2: Accounting, Budgeting) 
 “Obviously there was a lack of understanding of what it [RAB] meant and I still think, it still persists. I remember I used to work on introducing a new budget database that was going 
to manage a lot of our reporting to Treasury and we used to go up and visit a guy who worked in Rural Affairs. He was always harking on about the elegant simplicity of the old ways and 
was really pretty resistant to the whole thing.” (SD5: Accounting, Budgeting) 
Incremental 
Strategy  
(1- positive, 2- 
negative) 
Examples of quotations/coding (identifying interviewee) 
Authorisation “That has had a very dramatic effect on departments and it’s something that permanent secretaries have been much more animated about because it has made it difficult for them to spend 
money in ways that they otherwise might have spent money because they’ve now got two or three extra loops of approvals to go through. And if they want to go and recruit somebody from, 
wherever, they need to go and seek the state’s approval and then Francis Maude’s [a minister] approval, for one interim to work for ten months. So that’s a kind of castration of authority 
that’s never been there before for the civil service.” (WD2: AUT2) 
Rationalisation/
logos 
“What’s really difficult is measuring the real outputs with your money. You know it might be how many children go to school, you can tell that, but if you say how many businesses did 
you help, or how many did you take in from bankruptcy or whatever, you never really see those numbers. We’ve got so many elements in our businesses that are very difficult to measure. 
So I think we’re still sort of seeking ways to better align what are you getting for your money in terms of actual output.” (SD6: RAT1).  
Normalisation/
ethos 
“There is more of it [change] going on in some places than others, but unfortunately in some corners there’s not much of it happening at all and again, it’s why industry is so much better 
at it – it has to satisfy a bunch of shareholders who demand improvement, growth and constantly greater efficiency and all those things.” (WF1: NOR1) 
Pathos “There have been several benefits and the quality of engagement that we are having with the institution has increased. We are now talking about collective contribution to national aspiration. 
The sector itself sees it as an opportunity to demonstrate to government what they are delivering for a significant amount of public funds which they see as putting them in a better place for 
spending review time. They are not pulling out research or economists’ reports out of a drawer and telling them here is how wonderful we are… they are actually drawing on something which 
is part of the day to day process...this is what you asked us to deliver and this is us demonstrating that we are delivering”. (SD6: PAT1) 
Moralisation  “You know, when most people think about rural development it’s about people coming together. Whether it’s to preserve a village hall and much more; but at the same time we give a third 
of the budget, so a third of £1.2billion, went to farmers for maintaining land. We are required to review less favoured areas…” (SD4: MOR1) 
Narrativisation  “How useful people looking at them [performance measures] find them? I suppose what they inevitably are, at least, is an indicator of whether something is going in the right direction 
or is going in the other direction. You know, external, visible indicators. So for example, I suppose the employment picture, the economic-type picture, and some of that. The Scottish 
government doesn’t produce a nice glossy annual report that says “this is what we said we’d do; and this is what we’ve done” […] Does absolutely everything work so that everyone can follow 
it though? No, and that would be lovely.” (SF3: NAR2) 
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i It is important, although beyond the scope of this paper, to note that legitimation strategies do not only represent rhetorical devices available to the actors to translate and understand 
change, but can also be used by individuals to gain or exercise power within an organisation. We thank one of the reviewers for pointing this out.  
ii It is important to stress that this paper adopts the definition of outcome of change (incremental vs. radical) as the movement between archetypes. We follow the wording and 
definitions provided by previous archetype theory literature; it is not our aim to assess the success of change. Sometimes the word ‘outcome’ can be used as an element within a 
management (or performance) system consisting of inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes, with outcome defined in terms the long-term effect of a change on an organisation’s 
effectiveness and efficiency. This is not its meaning in the context of this research.   
iii It is interesting to note that Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent (1992), although using a different theoretical lens (Habermasian concepts), identify and explore ‘first order’ (akin to 
incremental change in this study) and ‘second order’ (akin to radical change) change concepts. A major difference in the approach of these authors is that they consider the 
organisational level rather than the individual level (which is the focus in this study).     
iv In order to avoid unnecessary length, only summary information about the interviewees and examples of the analysed documents is provided in the paper. More information is 
available from the authors on request. 
v In some cases, while coding, it was not possible to identify any outcome of change from the interviewees’ statements. In these instances, a residual category was coded as ‘outcome 
not mentioned’. For presentational purposes, this has not been reported in the paper. 
vi Andrew Likierman was Head of the UK Government Accountancy Service from 1993 until 2004. He was responsible for the development and implementation of RAB. 
                                                            
